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The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets
him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its
failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter
1
of its own existence.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Referring to the exclusionary rule implicit in the Fourth
Amendment, Justice Clark seemingly predicts the future Minnesota
2
case of State v. Jackson. The Jackson case addresses the overarching
issue of whether a statutorily invalid nighttime search implicates
the Fourth Amendment which, in turn, provides a separate and
independent basis of suppression apart from statutory
3
considerations. Although officers found methamphetamine while
searching Jackson’s home, and she was later found guilty of
numerous crimes, she went free on what appears to be a
technicality—the search was conducted in violation of a Minnesota
4
making it
statute prohibiting most nighttime searches,
‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment and requiring
5
suppression of the seized evidence through the exclusionary rule.
The Jackson decision is noteworthy because the United States
Supreme Court has never directly decided whether a statutorily
invalid nighttime search implicates the Fourth Amendment and its
6
underlying remedies. Lower courts directly deciding the issue are
7
split. Thus, no universal framework for analysis exists. Yet the
1. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (Clark, J.).
2. 742 N.W.2d 163 (Minn. 2007).
3. See id. at 167 (discussing Jackson’s claim that the statutorily invalid
nighttime search of her home violated her Fourth Amendment rights, requiring
suppression).
4. See MINN. STAT. § 626.14 (2006).
5. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 166, 176–80.
6. Jeffry R. Gittins, Comment, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule: Extending the
Rationale of Hudson v. Michigan to Evidence Seized During Unauthorized Nighttime
Searches, 2007 BYU L. REV. 451, 468 (2007). See also infra Part II.C.1.
7. Compare United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897 (3d Cir.
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Minnesota Supreme Court held that searches conducted in
violation of Minnesota’s nighttime search statute may implicate the
8
Fourth Amendment and its exclusionary rule. Although Jackson
lets a guilty person go free, the decision is supported by history,
9
precedent, and most importantly, the Fourth Amendment.
This case note will first explore America’s particular aversion
toward nighttime searches, both before and after ratification of the
10
The note then discusses the Supreme
Fourth Amendment.
Court’s development of the basic Fourth Amendment analytical
framework, followed by the evolution of federal and state nighttime
11
search jurisprudence. Next, the Jackson decision is discussed in
12
detail, followed by an in-depth analysis of the decision, applying
the Fourth Amendment analytical framework to highlight the main
13
flaw in the court’s reasoning. Last, this note concludes that the
Fourth Amendment can provide a separate and independent basis
14
for suppression and therefore Jackson was correctly decided.
II. HISTORY
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees that:
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
15
search and persons or things to be seized.
1968) (concluding nighttime home searches may be a significant factor in
determining reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment), and State v. Garcia,
45 P.3d 900, 904 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (noting jurisdictions are split on whether
execution of an invalid nighttime search warrant implicates constitutional rights),
with United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117, 1124 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding
particular procedures required under nighttime search statutes are not part of the
Fourth Amendment), and Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d 302, 304
(Mass. 1992) (noting many courts have rejected that nighttime search limitations
have any basis in the constitution).
8. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 174 (citing State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 839–40
(Minn. 1978)).
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Parts II.B, II.C.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Ratified in 1791, the amendment was born out of two English
colonial practices—the use of general warrants and writs of
16
assistance. Even so, the Fourth Amendment contains no explicit
17
language prohibiting nighttime searches. Yet, history shows that
Americans look upon nighttime intrusions with particular distaste.
A. The Nighttime Search Aversion
Prior to 1750, nighttime searches were astonishingly common
18
in the American colonies.
Although English general warrants
prohibited nighttime execution, this exception was ignored in
19
America until the mid-eighteenth century. Execution of writs of
20
assistance, however, was always limited to daytime. In any event,
by the 1780s every state but Delaware enacted statutes prohibiting
21
nighttime searches.
The founding fathers also valued their nighttime in-home
16. See, e.g., Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment was adopted in view of long misuse of power in the matter of searches
and seizures both in England and the colonies . . . .”). See Steagald v. United
States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981). General warrants lost their footing in America
during the mid-1760s because of colonial legislation, execution methods, and the
“intellectual legacy denouncing those methods.” Id. at 220. Writs of assistance lost
their footing shortly after “Paxton’s case” was decided in 1761. See David E.
Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56 FLA. L.
REV. 1051, 1067 (Dec. 2004) (citing William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment:
Origins and Original Meaning 75 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Claremont Graduate School) (noting after Paxton’s case “colonial courts issued
the writs sporadically and customs officers never executed the writs effectively.”).
See also Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77
B.U. L. REV. 925, 945 (Dec. 1997) (citing O. M. DICKERSON, WRITS OF ASSISTANCE AS
A CAUSE OF THE REVOLUTION, IN THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40 (Richard
B. Morris ed., 1939)) (“[H]istorians have described resistance to the writs as a
major cause of the Revolution.”). Historically used to search and seize libelous
materials, general warrants merely specified an offense, leaving the decision of
where to search and whom to arrest to the discretion of the official executing the
warrant. Maclin, supra, at 1066–67 (citing Cuddihy, supra at 1040). Writs of
assistance gave unfettered discretion to the customs officers who carried them out,
subjecting anyone to home or personal invasion by the Crown at any time.
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. Maclin, supra note 16, at 971 (citing Cuddihy, supra note 16, at 865–66).
19. See id. at 940 (citing Cuddihy, supra note 16, at 425–26) (noting the
Virginia colony required execution of general warrants during daylight hours by
1745).
20. Gittins, supra note 6, at 467–68 (citing O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875
F.2d 1465, 1473 (10th Cir. 1989)).
21. Maclin, supra note 16, at 971 (citing Cuddihy, supra note 16, at 1346
n.228).
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22

privacy. Even the first Congress, prior to ratification of the Fourth
Amendment, expressed its disapproval of nighttime intrusions by
23
After their
passing two acts prohibiting nighttime searches.
enactment, “the reluctance to authorize nighttime searches except
under exceptional circumstances continued as an integral part of
24
our jurisprudence.” Much of this jurisprudence seems to focus on
federal and state laws limiting execution of search warrants to
25
daytime hours.
One such federal law was the Espionage Act of 1917, requiring
government officials applying for a nighttime warrant to be positive
26
In 1946,
that the property to be seized was on the premises.
certain provisions of the Act were replaced by the Federal Rules of
27
Criminal Procedure. By 1972 and still to this day, Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41 requires an additional showing over and
above Fourth Amendment probable cause for issuance of a valid
28
nighttime search warrant.
29
In Jones v. United States, decided in 1958, the Supreme Court
30
reaffirmed Rule 41’s additional nighttime search justification.
The search in Jones was conducted around 9 p.m., after dark, with
31
an expired daytime warrant. Unsurprisingly, the Court held the
search invalid, but not before noting that nothing could be “a more
severe invasion of privacy than [a] nighttime intrusion into a
22. For example, in 1774 John Adams declared:
[E]very English[man] values himself exceedingly, he takes a Pride and
he glories justly in that strong Protection, that sweet Security, that
delightful Tranquility which the Laws have thus secured to him in his
own House, especially in the night. Now to deprive a Man of this
Protection, this quiet Security in the dead of Night, when himself and
Family confiding in it are asleep, is treat[ing] him not like an
Englishman not like a Freeman but like a Slave . . . .
1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 137 (Worth & Zobel eds., The Belknap Press 1965).
23. United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d at 898. The laws were: Act
of July 31, 1789, § 24, 1 Stat. 43 and Act of March 3, 1791, § 29, 1 Stat. 206. Id.
The Fourth Amendment was ratified on December 15, 1791. See U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
24. United States ex rel. Boyance, 398 F.2d at 898.
25. See infra Part II.C.1.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 620 (1940).
27. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 463 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
28. Id. at 463–64. Today’s version of Rule 41 requires a warrant applicant to
provide the issuing judge “good cause” to issue a nighttime warrant otherwise the
warrant must be executed during the day. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A)(ii).
29. 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
30. Id. at 498–99.
31. Id. at 495.
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32

private home.” Justice Frankfurter has even compared nighttime
33
searches to “evil in its most obnoxious form.”
States have also shown their aversion towards nighttime
searches. State common law does not expressly prohibit such
34
This aversion
searches but does look upon them unfavorably.
results from revulsion at the indignity of rousing people from their
35
Moreover, the common law regards nighttime police
beds.
intrusions as a great threat to privacy, destructive of home sanctity,
36
Yet
and a danger to police and slumbering citizens.
Massachusetts, for example, has expressly authorized nighttime
37
searches by statute since 1836. Upholding the statute in the 1887
38
decision of Commonwealth v. Hinds, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court opinion still indicates an aversion towards nighttime
39
searches.
40
Many other states have similar statutes.
For example,
41
Alabama enacted a statute limiting nighttime searches in 1852.
Even Delaware came to its sense by 1893 when its legislature
enacted a statute requiring daytime warrants unless an express
nighttime provision was necessary to prevent “‘an escape, or

32. Id. at 498. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477 (1971)
(noting nighttime home entries are an “extremely serious intrusion.”).
33. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
34. See Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d at 304 (citing
Commonwealth v. Hinds, 13 N.E. 397 (Mass. 1887)) (noting a “strong hostility to
nighttime searches” at common law).
35. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 495 N.E.2d 328, 332 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1986)).
36. Id. (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.7(b), at 266 (2d. ed.
1987)).
37. Id. at 305 (citing Commonwealth v. Garcia, 501 N.E.2d 527, 528 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1986)).
38. Hinds, 13 N.E. at 399–400.
39. See id. The statute at issue had four sections. Id. at 399. The first two
provided specific situations when a search warrant would issue (e.g., search for
stolen property). Id. The third section contained a default daytime execution
provision. Id. The fourth section allowed the issuance of a nighttime warrant if
any of the situations described in the first two sections was present. Id. at 399–400.
Thus, an aversion still existed.
40. Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Propriety of Execution of Search Warrants at
Nighttime, 41 A.L.R. 5th 171 (1996). See also Cipes v. Graham, 386 F. Supp. 2d 34,
40 n.3 (D. Conn. 2005) (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 4.7 at 650
(4th ed. 2004) (“[A] heightened standard for nighttime searches is mandated by
statute or court rule in 23 states, while 14 states explicitly authorize execution at
any time, and the remaining 13 states . . . have no pertinent provision.”).
41. See ALA. CODE § 15-5-8 (1975).
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removal of the person, or things, to be searched for.’”
43
Minnesota enacted its nighttime search law in 1963. Similar
to other nighttime search statutes, Minnesota’s law prohibits
searches between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., absent a
showing of a need to prevent the loss of evidence or to protect
44
police or public safety. Not surprisingly, the policy of Minnesota’s
law “is to protect the public from the ‘abrasiveness of official
45
intrusions’ during the night.”
Whether the Fourth Amendment applies in these ‘exceptional
46
however, remains an anomaly in Fourth
circumstances,’
Amendment jurisprudence as the Supreme Court has never
47
Nevertheless, if a statute limiting
directly decided the issue.
nighttime searches is violated and can provide its own basis of
suppression, then whether the Fourth Amendment can provide a
separate and independent basis of suppression requires application
48
of an elementary Fourth Amendment analysis.
B. Evolution of General Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
Not until 1886 did the Supreme Court decide the first
49
important Fourth Amendment case. Ever since, “[t]he course of
true law pertaining to searches and seizures . . . has not—to put it
50
mildly—run smooth.” As such, tracking key Fourth Amendment
Supreme Court decisions establishing the general Fourth
42. Petit v. Colomary, 55 A. 344, 345 (Del. 1903) (quoting 97 Del. Laws 737, §
29 (1893)).
43. See MINN. STAT. § 626.14 (2006).
44. Id.
45. State v. Stephenson, 310 Minn. 229, 233, 245 N.W.2d 621, 624 (1976)
(quoting United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1201 (2d Cir. 1970)).
46. United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d at 898. See also supra notes
23–24 and accompanying text.
47. Gittins, supra note 6, at 468.
48. See Gooding v. United States, 461 U.S. 430, 461–65 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (discussed infra Part II.C.1).
49. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 107 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da
Capa Press (1970) (republished from 1913 original) (referring to Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)). Before Boyd, less than fifty opinions discussed the
Fourth Amendment. Steinberg, supra note 16, at 1072. Boyd held that a federal
statute requiring a citizen to turn over certain records on the request of a U.S.
Attorney constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 620–22, 638.
50. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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Amendment analytical framework is a necessary step to understand
why statutorily invalid nighttime searches might implicate the
Fourth Amendment which, in turn, can provide a separate and
independent basis of suppression.
1.

Fourth Amendment Applicability: Katz v. United States

As we approach an arguable Fourth Amendment problem we
51
should always first ask whether the amendment is applicable.
Since the mid-twentieth century, the Fourth Amendment has been
52
Although the word privacy
held to protect personal privacy.
appears nowhere in the Constitution, the right emanates from
53
The seminal case
certain amendments, including the Fourth.
linking the Fourth Amendment to a right of privacy and answering
the applicability question was explored in 1967 in Katz v. United
54
States.
Katz involved the issue of whether law enforcement’s
electronic tapping of a public telephone booth without a warrant
55
constitutes a ‘search’ implicating the Fourth Amendment. The
majority concluded that a search occurred within a protected place
56
and therefore a warrant was required. However, the Katz majority
failed to articulate what constitutes a ‘place’ protected by the
57
Fourth Amendment. Luckily, Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz,
58
articulated a two-step analysis to answer this question.
The first step in the analysis is to determine whether a person
has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” in the
59
place. The second step is to determine whether that expectation
60
is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”
Applying the test to the facts of Katz, Justice Harlan first concluded
that Katz exhibited an actual expectation of privacy when he
entered the public telephone booth, shut the door behind him,
51. Charles E. Moylan, Jr. & John Sonsteng, Fourth Amendment Applicability, 16
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 209, 210 (1990).
52. Note, Protecting Personal Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, 91 YALE L.J.
313, 313 (Dec. 1981).
53. Id. at 313 n.2 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85
(1965)).
54. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
55. Id. at 349–51.
56. See id. at 359.
57. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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61

and paid the toll. Next, Justice Harlan concluded that society is
prepared to recognize Katz’s expectation as reasonable because a
public telephone booth is no longer accessible once occupied, with
62
the door closed and toll paid.
Today, Justice Harlan’s Katz concurrence is “[t]he touchstone
63
If no expectation of
of [any] Fourth Amendment analysis.”
privacy exists, there is no ‘search’ and the Fourth Amendment is
64
inapplicable. But if such an expectation exists, then a court must
65
next determine whether the Fourth Amendment is satisfied.
2.

Satisfying the Fourth Amendment: Camara v. Municipal Court

Satisfaction of the Fourth Amendment requires an inquiry into
whether the search was reasonable, determined by the Camara
66
The Camara decision addressed the issue of
balancing test.
whether the City of San Francisco’s warrantless housing codeenforcement inspections violated the Fourth Amendment’s
67
The test articulated by the Court
reasonableness requirement.
requires balancing the government’s need to search against the
68
invasion which the search entails.
The Court held the warrantless administrative searches
69
‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment. The Court also
concluded, however, that the housing code-enforcement
inspections were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, if a
61. Id.
62. See id. (noting a public telephone booth becomes a “temporarily private
place whose momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are
recognized as reasonable.”).
63. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
64. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (stating that “[i]f the
inspection by police does not intrude upon a legitimate expectation of privacy,
there is no ‘search’ subject to the Warrant Clause.”).
65. Moylan & Sonsteng, supra note 51, at 210.
66. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (citing United States
v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 654 (1979)) (holding that “[o]ur cases show that in determining
reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968) (citing Camara v. Mun. Court,
387 U.S. 523, 534–35, 536–37 (1967)) (noting reasonableness is determined by the
Camara balancing test).
67. Camara, 387 U.S. at 525.
68. Id. at 536–37.
69. Id. at 534.
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valid administrative warrant were first obtained, for three reasons.
First, history shows that such inspections are accepted by the courts
71
and the public. Second, the public’s interest in preventing and
abating dangerous housing conditions cannot be satisfied without
72
Finally, the
inspecting the interior of a private structure.
inspections involve a limited invasion of an individual’s privacy
which is “neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of
73
evidence of a crime.”
Thus, according to Camara, “[i]f a valid public interest justifies
the intrusion contemplated,” then a judge may “issue a suitably
74
However, if governmental agents
restricted search warrant.”
search a private dwelling without a valid warrant, they run the
considerable risk of violating the reasonableness requirement of
75
the Fourth Amendment. If the Fourth Amendment applies and is
not satisfied, the next inquiry is whether the unreasonably-obtained
76
evidence should be excluded from trial.
3. Suppression of Unreasonably Obtained Evidence: Weeks v.
United States and Mapp v. Ohio
77

Prior to the 1914 decision of Weeks v. United States, any
relevant evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment was
78
admissible at trial. However, the Weeks ‘exclusionary rule’ finally
70. Id. at 537.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 539.
75. See id. See also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (quoting
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)) (holding that “‘searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”); United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984) (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748–49
(1984)) (holding that warrantless home searches are presumptively
unreasonable); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211–12 (1981) (same);
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (same).
76. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983) (stating “whether the
exclusionary rule’s remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long been
regarded as an issue separate from . . . whether the Fourth Amendment rights of
the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.”).
77. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
78. See, e.g., Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 595 (1904) (holding that
common law does not bar admission of illegally seized evidence); United States v.
La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F.Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) (stating that
how evidence is obtained does not affect admissibility); Commonwealth v. Dana,
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gave the Fourth Amendment the bite to complement its bark.
Weeks involved the issue of whether evidence seized by a
federal agent during a warrantless search, in violation of the Fourth
79
Amendment, should be excluded. The Court required exclusion,
stating that “[i]f [evidence] can thus be seized and held and used
in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection
of the Fourth Amendment . . . is of no value, and, so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
80
Constitution.” The Court’s holding, however, applied only to the
81
82
In Mapp v. Ohio, decided in 1961, the
federal government.
Court applied the Weeks exclusionary rule to the states through the
83
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
4. The ‘Good Faith’ Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: United
States v. Leon
“[T]he [exclusionary] rule is a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights . . . through its
84
deterrent effect.”
As such, its application is limited to those
85
circumstances where its remedial objectives are best served. Thus,
86
many exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist, including the
87
‘good faith’ exception first articulated in United States v. Leon.
Simply put, evidence obtained with a search warrant later
found invalid is admissible if the officers who applied for, and
executed the warrant, had an objectively reasonable good faith
88
Thus, if “the officers were
belief in the warrant’s validity.
dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have
harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of
43 Mass. 329, 337 (1841) (stating that the court was not concerned with legality of
seizure, only relevance of evidence).
79. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 389.
80. Id. at 393.
81. Id. at 398.
82. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
83. Id. at 655–56.
84. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (establishing the
‘knock-and-announce’ exception); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)
(establishing the ‘inevitability of discovery’ and ‘independent source’ exceptions);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963) (establishing the ‘fruit of
the poisonous tree’ doctrine).
87. 468 U.S. 897, 923–24 (1984).
88. Id. at 922–23.
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probable cause,” then the exclusionary rule is still applicable.
However, “‘a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to
establish’ that a law enforcement officer has ‘acted in good faith
90
conducting the search.’”
With the Fourth Amendment analytical framework in place,
the question becomes whether any portion of it applies to
statutorily invalid nighttime searches. As with the evolution of
search and seizure law generally, “[t]he course of true law
pertaining to [nighttime] searches and seizures . . . has not—to put
91
it mildly—run smooth.”
C. Evolution of Nighttime Search Jurisprudence
1.

Federal Case Law

A dissenting opinion is the closest the United States Supreme
Court has come to answering whether a statutorily invalid
92
nighttime search implicates the Fourth Amendment. Decided in
1974, Gooding v. United States concerned the issue of whether
evidence seized during a nighttime search under a federal drug
enforcement law was valid, and if not, whether suppression was
93
required. The warrant, which allowed execution “‘at any time in
the day or night,’” was executed at 9:30 p.m. resulting in the
94
The majority held the particular
seizure of drug contraband.
95
search was valid, and therefore suppression was not required.
Oddly, the majority never mentioned the Fourth Amendment in its
96
analysis.
Justice Marshall, however, did address the Fourth Amendment
89. Id. at 926.
90. Id. at 922 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 n.32 (1982)).
91. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
92. See Gittins, supra note 6, at 468–69 (noting that Gooding v. United States,
416 U.S. 430, 431 (1974) is the closest the Supreme Court has come to addressing
the issue but only Justice Marshall, in his dissent, discussed the constitutional
implications of nighttime searches).
93. Gooding, 416 U.S. at 431. The federal law at issue provided: “[A] search
warrant relating to offenses involving controlled substances may be served at any
time of day or night if the judge or United States magistrate issuing the warrant is
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that grounds exist for the warrant
and for its service at such time.” Id. at 439 n.8 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 879(a)
(1970)).
94. Id. at 442–43.
95. Id. at 458.
96. See id. at 430–59.
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issues in his dissent. According to Justice Marshall, the majority
analyzed the particular nighttime search statute in a “vacuum” and
97
was “totally oblivious” to Fourth Amendment considerations.
After citing Katz for the proposition that the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect the individual’s reasonable expectations
of privacy from unjustified governmental intrusion, Justice Marshall
felt “there is no expectation of privacy more reasonable and more
demanding of constitutional protection than our right to expect
that we will be let alone in the privacy of our homes during the
98
Then, referencing Camara, Justice Marshall noted that
night.”
reasonable nighttime searches require an additional justification
99
However, as the
above Fourth Amendment probable cause.
petitioner in Gooding never claimed Fourth Amendment
protection, Justice Marshall and the majority viewed the cases as
100
one of statutory interpretation.
Lower federal courts have confronted similar situations, with
mixed results. For example, in United States ex rel. Boyance v.
101
Myers, decided six years before Gooding, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals concluded the time of execution may be a significant
factor in determining reasonableness under the Fourth
102
103
However, in United States v. Searp, decided four
Amendment.
years after Gooding, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held the
particular procedures required by nighttime search statutes are not
104
Thus, lower federal courts are
part of the Fourth Amendment.
105
split on the issue. The states are no different.

97. Id. at 461–62 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 462.
99. Id. at 464–65. See also, United States v. Schoenheit, 856 F.2d 74, 77 (8th
Cir. 1988) (establishing that the time of search is relevant to whether the search is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d
1320, 1326 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that nighttime searches are “sensitively
related to the reasonableness issue.”).
100. Gooding, 416 U.S. at 465 (majority opinion).
101. 398 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1968).
102. Id. at 897.
103. 586 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1978).
104. Id. at 1124.
105. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Mass. 1992)
(noting numerous courts have rejected that nighttime search limitations have any
basis in the Constitution); State v. Garcia, 45 P.3d 900, 904 (N.M. Ct. App.
2002)(noting jurisdictions are split on whether the execution of an invalid
nighttime search warrant implicates constitutional rights).
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Minnesota Case Law

Minnesota’s first foray into the debate began with State v.
106
107
Lien, decided on both statutory and constitutional grounds. In
September 1977, police officers obtained a nighttime search
warrant which was later found invalid under Minn. Stat. section
108
The officers arrived at Lien’s residence at 8:50 p.m. and
626.14.
watched the people come and go from Lien’s apartment while
109
When Lien arrived home
preparing to execute the warrant.
shortly after 9:00 p.m., the officers executed the warrant, entering
110
During the search, officers seized
through an open door.
marijuana and Lien was later charged with possession of a
111
controlled substance.
At trial, Lien moved to suppress the evidence seized during the
112
The district court suppressed the evidence after
search.
concluding that the affidavit on which the warrant was based lacked
113
a sufficient factual showing to justify a nighttime search.
114
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.
The court relied
considerably on Justice Marshall’s Gooding dissent, concluding that
115
nighttime searches may have a constitutional dimension.
Specifically, the Lien court noted that Justice Marshall “believed the
Constitution required additional justification for a nighttime
116
search... over and above the ordinary showing of probable cause.”
Thus, the court reasoned that section 626.14 requires a showing
117
that only a nighttime search can be successful. Since the affidavit
failed to state that Lien would not be home during the day, the
police failed to make a sufficient showing to justify a nighttime
search under section 626.14, and the warrant was therefore
118
119
invalid. Even so, the court allowed the evidence.
106. 265 N.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Minn. 1978).
107. Id. at 839–40.
108. Id. at 835–36.
109. Id. at 836.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 835–36.
112. Id. at 835.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 839 (citing Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 461–65 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
116. Id. (citing Gooding, 416 U.S. at 461–65).
117. Id. at 840 (citing State v. Van Wert, 294 Minn. 464, 199 N.W.2d 514
(1972)).
118. Id. at 836 (describing the form completed by the officer applying for the
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Suppression was unnecessary for two reasons. First, the
120
And second,
violation of section 626.14 was technical in nature.
the judge’s error in granting the nighttime search warrant on the
121
The
officer’s bare assertions was not of a constitutional nature.
Lien court’s reasoning seems to rest on the particular facts of the
case.
The statutorily invalid nighttime search warrant “was
122
executed at a reasonable hour when most people are still awake.”
Moreover, “[t]he police knew [Lien] had just returned home, was
fully clothed, there was considerable activity in his apartment, and
123
Thus, a mere
. . . [Lien’s apartment] door was partly open.”
technical violation of section 626.14 occurred and, as a result, the
124
Fourth Amendment was inapplicable.
Although Lien discusses the constitutional implications of a
nighttime search, the court never concluded whether the Fourth
Amendment provides a separate and independent basis of
suppression when a serious violation of section 626.14 occurs. In
2007, the court answered “the question left open in Lien, when
does a violation of the statute also become a constitutional
125
violation?”
III. THE JACKSON DECISION
A. Facts
At 9:25 p.m. on December 11, 2003, Itasca County police
officers executed a nighttime search warrant on Susan Jackson’s
126
After entering through a closed door, the officers
home.
discovered Jackson and her two children sitting at their kitchen
127
table. The officers handcuffed Jackson, demanding that she lead
128
Eventually, Jackson led
them to any illegal drugs in her home.
warrant, which stated that a nighttime search was “necessary to prevent the loss,
destruction, or removal of the objects of the search because it is unknown when
[Lien] will be at the premises described herein.”).
119. Id. at 840–41.
120. Id. at 841.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 155 (Minn. 2007) (referring to State v.
Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163 (Minn. 2007)).
126. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 166.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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police to multiple locations within her home containing
129
methamphetamine.
Rewind three hours. At 6:30 p.m. an Itasca County police
investigator conducting a narcotics investigation involving Todd
Dawson and Susan Jackson executed a valid search warrant on
130
The investigator
Dawson’s car after he left Jackson’s home.
discovered a large amount of methamphetamine and other drug
131
Based on this evidence and information from
paraphernalia.
Dawson and a “confidential reliable informant,” the investigator
132
The
applied for the warrant to search Jackson’s home.
investigator also requested a nighttime search authorization per
133
The district court judge granted the
section 626.14.
authorization on the investigator’s assertion that his investigation
134
led him “‘into the nighttime [sic] scope of search warrant.’”
B. Procedural History
135

Jackson was charged with numerous crimes.
Prior to trial,
136
She argued that
Jackson moved to suppress the seized evidence.
the investigator’s “affidavit failed to articulate a sufficient basis to
support a nighttime search” in violation of section 626.14 and both
137
The district
the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.
138
The court ruled the
court agreed but denied Jackson’s motion.
nighttime search warrant violation was statutory, rather than
129. Id. at 166–167.
Officers seized approximately 9.7 grams of
methamphetamine and other drug paraphernalia.
130. Id. at 166.
131. Id. The investigator discovered fifty-three grams of methamphetamine, a
large amount of cash, a digital gram scale, and plastic baggies. Id.
132. Id.
The investigator’s affidavit indicated the confidential reliable
informant saw Dawson drop-off methamphetamine at Jackson’s home and Jackson
sold methamphetamine. Id. Dawson told the investigator he was staying at
Jackson’s and the two were dating. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 165, 167. Jackson was charged with two counts of second-degree
controlled substance relating to the possession and sale of methamphetamine
under Minnesota Statute section 152.022, subdivisions 1(1), 2(1) (2006) and two
counts of child endangerment under Minnesota Statute section 609.378,
subdivision 1(b)(2) (2006). Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 167. Jackson’s argument was based on article I, section 10 of the
Minnesota Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Id. at 174–75. Both provisions are exactly the same. Compare U.S.
CONST. amend. IV, with MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
138. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 167.
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constitutional, and therefore suppression was unnecessary under
139
At trial, Jackson was found guilty on all
the circumstances.
140
141
charges. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed.
C. The Jackson Majority
1.

Statutory Suppression
142

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.
The court first
143
addressed Jackson’s statutory suppression argument. Noting that
only serious statutory violations “‘which subvert the purpose of
established procedures’” require suppression, the court concluded
the purpose of section 626.14 is to protect an individual’s interest
144
in being free from intrusion during a period of nighttime repose.
The court further indicated that its definition of the interest
145
protected by section 626.14 is highly fact-specific.
Here, police entered Jackson’s “Minnesota home at 9:25 p.m.
on December 11 when it would have been dark for several
146
Furthermore, the investigator’s affidavit failed to show a
hours.”
reasonable suspicion that a nighttime search was necessary to
147
Thus, the
preserve the evidence or protect the police or public.
search amounted to a serious violation of section 626.14 and
148
suppression was required.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 165–66, 167.
141. Id. at 166, 167. See also State v. Jackson, No. A05-247, 2006 WL 463576
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2006).
142. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 180.
143. Id. at 167–74 (discussing suppression under Minn. Stat. § 626.14 (2006)).
144. Id. at 168, 171 (quoting State v. Cook, 498 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn. 1993)).
The court based its definition of the interest protected by section 626.14 in large
part on the historical aversion towards nighttime searches. Id. at 169. The court
also quoted some definitions of “repose” including: “‘the state of being at rest,’
‘[f]reedom from worry; peace of mind,’ and ‘[c]almness; tranquility.’” Id. at 171
(quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1480 (4th ed. 2000)).
145. See id. at 171. The court explained that the right to protection under
section 626.14 “will depend ‘on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.’” Id. (quoting Youngstown
Sheet Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
146. Id. at 172.
147. Id. Meeting the nighttime authorization pursuant to section 626.14
requires that officers establish a “reasonable suspicion that a nighttime search is
necessary to preserve evidence or to protect officer or public safety.” Id. at 167–68
(citing State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006)). Also, the state
conceded the warrant was statutorily invalid. Id. at 167, 172.
148. Id. at 172, 174.
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Although the search clearly violated section 626.14, the court
149
still had to address State v. Lien. Distinguishing Lien on the facts,
the majority noted that in Lien, unlike here, officers entered the
residence through an open door and knew that Lien was not
sleeping, not engaged in personal behavior he intended to keep
150
private, and was fully clothed. Thus, officers knew Lien “had not
entered the period of nighttime repose that section 626.14 was
151
Conversely,
intended to protect” before entering his apartment.
152
the officers raiding Jackson’s home had no such information.
The majority also rejected the state’s argument that afteracquired information can form a basis to avoid suppression under
153
The court held that police cannot justify a
section 626.14.
statutorily invalid nighttime search with information discovered
only after they enter a home, showing the person had not yet
154
This undermines a
entered a period of nighttime repose.
person’s “statutory right to be free from the ‘abrasiveness of official
155
Thus, a serious, rather than
intrusions’ during the night.”
technical violation of section 626.14 occurred and suppression was
156
required under the statute.
2.

Fourth Amendment Suppression

The court could have based suppression on statutory grounds
157
alone, but it also ruled on Jackson’s constitutional argument.
The court reasoned that the dictates of history, the “Supreme
Court’s recognition of the especially intrusive nature of nighttime
searches,” and the “holdings of several federal courts that
nighttime searches implicate the reasonableness requirement of
the Fourth Amendment,” require that it take into account the time
of day in determining “whether a search is reasonable under the

149. 265 N.W.2d 833 (Minn. 1978).
150. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 173 (Minn. 2007)(citing Lien, 265
N.W.2d at 836, 841).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting State v. Stephenson, 310 Minn. 229, 233, 245 N.W.2d 621,
624 (1976)).
156. Id. at 174.
157. Id. The majority did so even though a prior Minnesota decision
recommends against ruling on constitutional issues if a decision may be made on
other grounds. See State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn. 2006).
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158

Fourth Amendment.”
Moreover, constitutional implications
underlie section 626.14 as the statute is designed to protect
159
individuals from unconstitutional nighttime searches.
Concluding that the Fourth Amendment was applicable, the
court next determined the statutorily invalid nighttime search of
160
The court first stated that a
Jackson’s home was ‘unreasonable.’
reasonable Fourth Amendment nighttime search requires an
161
The additional
additional justification beyond probable cause.
justification is codified in section 626.14 which allows nighttime
searches only to prevent a loss of evidence or to protect police or
162
Applying the Camara balancing test, the court
public safety.
concluded the invasion of privacy a nighttime search entails
outweighed law enforcement’s need to search Jackson’s home at
163
Since the investigator’s affidavit was insufficient to justify
night.
inclusion of a nighttime search provision under section 626.14, it
was also insufficient to meet the Fourth Amendment’s
164
Thus, it was unreasonable for
reasonableness requirement.
police to enter Jackson’s home at 9:25 p.m. without any
information relating to whether Jackson had not entered a period
165
of nighttime repose.
Last, the court held the exclusionary rule was applicable for
166
First, it was objectively unreasonable for police to
two reasons.
rely on the nighttime search provision of the warrant, included
only on the investigator’s “bare assertion” that a nighttime search
167
was necessary. Second, suppression is an acceptable way to deter
168
Thus, “the Fourth
future police conduct of this nature.
158. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 176–77 (Minn. 2007).
159. Id. at 174. The majority also noted the likely recurrence of the issue. Id.
160. Id. at 177.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)).
164. Id.
165. Id. The court also noted that it need not decide the precise time
“Jackson’s constitutionally protected period of nighttime repose began and
ended” as the search clearly fell within the protected period. Id.
166. Id. at 178–80.
167. Id. at 179. The majority rejected the dissent’s argument that the Leon
‘good faith’ exception should apply, noting Minnesota has specifically declined to
adopt the exception. Id. at 180 n.10 (citing State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 791
n.1 (Minn. 1999); State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn. 1995); State v.
Lindsey, 473 N.W.2d 857, 864 n.4 (Minn. 1991); State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d
700, 701 n.1 (Minn. 1990)).
168. Id. at 179.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 4

2009]

STATE V. JACKSON

671

Amendment provides a separate and independent basis from . . .
169
section 626.14 that requires suppression of the evidence. . . .”
D.

The Jackson Dissent
1.

Statutory Suppression
170

Three justices dissented, relying heavily on Lien.
According
to the dissent, the similarity of the facts to Lien requires the
conclusion that the search constituted a technical violation of
171
In Lien, as
section 626.14, therefore suppression is unnecessary.
here, the police executed a statutorily invalid nighttime search
172
Both Lien and Jackson were awake, fully clothed, and
warrant.
173
Furthermore, execution took place at similar
not in bed.
174
Thus, a “less than an hour-and-a-half technical violation”
times.
175
of section 626.14 does not require suppression.
Although in Lien officers were aware before entering the
apartment that Lien had not yet entered a period of nighttime
176
repose, the dissent argued this fact was immaterial. According to
the dissent, the inquiry should focus on the effect of the statutorily
invalid nighttime search on occupants of the home, not on whether
police know, before entering, that the occupants have not entered
177
Thus, whether suppression is
a period of nighttime repose.
allowed under section 626.14 does not depend on when police
learned that Jackson was not roused from sleep, but rather if
178
As Jackson was awake, a
Jackson was in fact roused from sleep.
mere technical violation of section 626.14 occurred and
179
suppression is unnecessary.
169. Id. at 180.
170. Id. (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Russell Anderson
and Justice Gildea also joined in Justice G. Barry Anderson’s dissent. Id. at 185.
171. Id. at 180–81.
172. Id. at 181 (citing State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Minn. 1978)).
173. Id. at 181. (citing Lien, 265 N.W.2d at 841).
174. Id. at 181. In Lien, the warrant was executed “shortly after 9 p.m.” Id.
(citing Lien, 265 N.W.2d at 836). In Jackson, the warrant was executed at 9:25 p.m.
Id. at 181.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 172–73 (majority opinion), 181–82 (Anderson, G. Barry, J.,
dissenting); see Lien, 265 N.W.2d at 841 (referring to the police’s level of
knowledge acquired before entering Lien’s home).
177. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 182 (Minn. 2007).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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Fourth Amendment Suppression

The dissent also noted that the decision not to suppress the
evidence in Lien was based on the conclusion that the error did not
180
implicate the Constitution.
Nevertheless, the dissent still
181
addressed, and rejected, the majority’s constitutional analysis.
According to the dissent, the federal courts’ holdings that
nighttime searches violate the Fourth Amendment “involved
searches pursuant to a warrant that either prohibited a nighttime
182
Here, the
search or did not explicitly authorize such a search.”
police acted pursuant to a warrant with a nighttime authorization
183
and therefore the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable.
184
Even so, the dissent addressed the suppression issue.
The
dissent rejected suppression based on the Leon good faith
exception, “because suppression would not deter wrongful police
activity and because the officers reasonably relied on the judge’s
185
Both the dissent and
authorization of the nighttime search.”
majority point out that “an officer’s reliance on a judge’s mistaken
determination must be objectively reasonable,” which means “that
the officer [has] ‘reasonable knowledge of what the law
186
However, the dissent believed that it was objectively
prohibits.’”
reasonable for the officers to rely on the nighttime search provision
187
Because prior Minnesota
when the entire affidavit is analyzed.
cases held evidence of drug related activity in an affidavit can justify
a nighttime search authorization, it was reasonable for the officers
to rely on the judge’s conclusion that the affidavit justified a
188
nighttime search provision.
180. Id. at 181, 182 (citing Lien, 265 N.W.2d at 841). The dissent also noted
that Minnesota courts should avoid constitutional issues if matters can be decided
otherwise. Id. at 183 (citing State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn. 2006);
In re Senty-Haugen, 583 N.W.2d 266, 269 n.3 (Minn. 1998)).
181. Id. at 183.
182. Id. (citing O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465 (10th Cir. 1989)
(warrant did not authorize nighttime search); United States ex rel. Boyance v.
Myers, 398 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1968) (warrant authorized daytime search only);
United States v. Merritt, 293 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1961)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 183–85.
185. Id. at 184.
186. Id. (quoting Leon v. United States, 468 U.S. 897, 919–20 n.20 (1984)).
187. Id. In other words, the majority took too narrow of an approach when it
reached its suppression conclusion based solely on that part of the investigator’s
affidavit which stated “[t]his investigation has led your affiant into the nighttime
[sic] scope of search warrant.” Id.
188. Id. (citing State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 928–29 (Minn. 2006); State v.
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However, unable to garner enough votes for a majority, the
dissent failed to stop the Minnesota Supreme Court from ruling
that the search of Jackson’s home seriously violated section 626.14,
189
implicating the Fourth Amendment and its exclusionary rule.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE JACKSON DECISION
Holding the statutorily invalid nighttime search of Jackson’s
home also implicates the Fourth Amendment, which, in turn,
provides a separate and independent basis of suppression. The
majority’s conclusion is correct, but its analysis is flawed in one
critical respect. The seminal case determining whether the Fourth
Amendment is implicated under particular facts is eerily absent
from the Jackson opinion. The Jackson decision rests mainly on
Justice Marshall’s Gooding dissent, yet the case contains no mention
190
of Justice Harlan’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test.
Justice Marshall, in Gooding, indicated his approval of Justice
Harlan’s two-part test when he declared “[t]he Fourth Amendment
was intended to protect our reasonable expectations of privacy
191
When the test is
from unjustified governmental intrusion.”
192
applied to Jackson’s facts, the Fourth Amendment is implicated.
Once implicated, Jackson’s facts further suggest that the nighttime
193
And
search was unreasonable under the Camara balancing test.
the unreasonableness of the search requires the conclusion that
the evidence be suppressed under the Weeks-Mapp exclusionary
194
This analysis also shows that the Jackson
rule, without exception.
195
dissent is wrong, both in its conclusion and analysis.
Saver, 295 Minn. 581, 582, 295 N.W.2d 508, 508–09 (1973)).
189. Id. at 180.
190. The Minnesota Supreme Court has used the test both before and after
Jackson. See, e.g., In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 2003)
(applying Justice Harlan’s two-part test in context of warrantless search of an
underage drinking party); State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Minn. 2007)
(decided later the same day as Jackson but applying Justice Harlan’s two-part test in
nighttime search context). Thus, why the Jackson court never applied the
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test in its constitutional analysis is extremely
odd, especially when the main point of contention between the majority and
dissent is whether the Fourth Amendment even applies.
191. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
192. See infra Part IV.A.
193. See infra Part IV.B.
194. See infra Parts IV.C–IV.D.
195. See infra Parts IV.A–IV.D.
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A. Application of Justice Harlan’s ‘Reasonable Expectation of Privacy’
Test
Again, the first part of Justice Harlan’s two-step test is whether
a person has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
196
The facts of Jackson show that
privacy” in the particular place.
Ms. Jackson exhibited an expectation of privacy in her home on
197
She was inside, sitting at the kitchen
December 11 at 9:25 p.m.
table with her two children when the police entered through a
198
closed door. If a person who occupies a public telephone booth,
closing the door behind him is “entitled to assume that his
199
conversation is not being intercepted,” then surely one who
occupies their private home, closing the door behind her, is
entitled to assume that the police will not barge in, absent a
200
sufficient justification (e.g., a valid warrant).
Yet this conclusion is not automatic because the first part of
201
Justice Harlan’s test is a question of fact. Thus, there may be rare
196. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
197. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Minn. 2007).
198. Id.
199. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
200. Obviously a search of Jackson’s home took place, but the question is
whether a search subject to the Fourth Amendment took place. Normally, a search of a
private home is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 511 (1961) (“‘[A]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right
of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.’”)). However, here section 626.14 can provide its own
basis of suppression and by providing Jackson with a separate and independent
basis of suppression through the Fourth Amendment, the majority risks, as the
dissent warns, that the constitutional portion of the opinion may be read as dicta.
Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 183 n.2 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting). Employing
Justice Harlan’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test in the context of a search
conducted in violation of section 626.14 circumvents this result. In all search and
seizure cases, “the person making the Fourth Amendment claim must affirmatively
show that his or her protected interests as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment
have been invaded . . . .” PHILLIP A. HUBERT, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE
LAW 112 (2005). The affirmative showing is made by satisfying Justice Harlan’s
test. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“[A] [Fourth
Amendment] ‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
consider reasonable is infringed.”) (emphasis added). As will be seen, if a technical
violation of section 626.14 occurs, the fact-specific nature of Justice Harlan’s test
will prove the Fourth Amendment inapplicable as in Lien. See infra notes 209–10
and accompanying text. But if a serious violation of section 626.14 occurs, as in
Jackson, the Fourth Amendment will be applicable. See infra notes 201–03 and
accompanying text. See also, infra note 199 and accompanying text.
201. United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418, 423 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing United
States v. Monie, 907 F.2d 793, 794 (8th Cir. 1990)).
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times when a person has not exhibited a subjective expectation of
privacy in their home at night. However, in the context of a serious
violation of section 626.14, this is unlikely. The Jackson majority
acknowledged this, although in a statutory context:
[F]or example, if the police search an unlit home at
3:00 a.m. without proper nighttime authorization,
they run considerable risk of violating the occupants’
interest in being free from intrusion during a
nighttime period of repose. But if the police search a
home at 8:30 p.m. on the summer solstice when the
doors are open and a party is underway... they are
much less likely to run the risk of seriously violating
the occupants’ interest in being free from such
202
intrusion.
Thus, “[b]ecause the factual circumstances of Fourth
Amendment cases are so diverse, ‘no template is likely to produce
sounder results than examining the totality of the circumstances in
203
. . . .’” determining whether the amendment is implicated in the
context of a nighttime search.
Police entered Jackson’s home through a closed door without
204
any indication of activity either inside or outside the house.
Presumably lights were on since Jackson and her children were
sitting at the kitchen table when the police barged in, but nothing
else indicates that Jackson had not yet entered a period of
205
Moreover, the police entered Jackson’s home
nighttime repose.
at 9:30 p.m. on December 11, during the winter solstice, when it
206
Thus,
would have been dark for nearly four-and-a-half hours.
202. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 171 (majority opinion). The dissent seems to
agree by recognizing that:
[i]f different facts are posited, e.g., the occupants of the home are
asleep at the time the warrant is executed, the warrant does not
authorize a nighttime search, or there is evidence of what the
majority fears might happen—that the police are ‘play[ing] the
odds’ in ignoring the statutory requirements—there is little doubt
the analysis would change as well.
Id. at 182 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
203. Cipes v. Graham, 386 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37 (D. Conn. 2005) (quoting United
States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 35 (2003)).
204. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 166 (majority opinion).
205. See id. (noting police discovered Jackson and her two children awake only
after entering their home).
206. Id. According to the United States Naval Observatory, the end of civil
twilight on December 11, 2003 in Grand Rapids, Minnesota (the largest city in
Itasca County) was at 4:59 p.m. U.S. Naval Observatory Astronomical Applications
Dept. Website, Sun and Moon Data for One Day, http://aa.usno.navy.mil/
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Jackson exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in being free
from unjustified governmental intrusion on that day, at that
particular time.
Clearly, the first part of Justice Harlan’s two-step test is highly
207
Yet, if the first step is satisfied, the next step is
fact-specific.
whether society is prepared to recognize the individual’s subjective
208
209
This is a question of law.
expectation of privacy as reasonable.
As the Jackson majority correctly points out, the Fourth Amendment
must be construed in light of what was deemed unreasonable when
210
the amendment was adopted.
Recalling the historical aversion towards nighttime searches
indicates that American society has consistently frowned upon
211
Since “there is no expectation
nighttime searches in particular.
of privacy more reasonable and more demanding of constitutional
protection than our right to expect that we will be let alone in the
212
privacy of our homes during the night,” it follows that society is
prepared to recognize a person’s subjective expectation of being
free from unjustified governmental intrusions at night as
reasonable.
Applying Justice Harlan’s test also shows why the majority’s
rejection of Lien is correct. Lien never exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy in his apartment when police executed the
213
People were coming and going, Lien had just arrived
warrant.
home, and the door to Lien’s apartment was open when the police
214
As to the nighttime aspect, the search of Lien’s
entered.
data/docs/RS_OneDay.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Sun and Moon
Data for One Day].
207. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (stating that first “a person [must] have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy.”).
208. Id.
209. United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418, 423 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing United
States v. Monie, 907 F.2d 793, 794 (8th Cir. 1990)).
210. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 176 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
149 (1925)). See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–25 (1886) (noting
that “[i]n order to ascertain the nature of the proceedings intended by the
[F]ourth [A]mendment . . . under the terms ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’
it is only necessary to recall the contemporary or then recent history of the
controversies on the subject, both in this country and in England.”).
211. See supra Part II.A.
212. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
213. State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Minn. 1978).
214. Id.
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apartment began around 9:00 p.m. on September 23, when it
215
Thus, Lien’s
would have been dark for only an hour-and-a-half.
facts show the unlikelihood of Lien exhibiting a subjective
expectation of privacy on that day, at that particular time.
Since Lien’s facts fail the first part of Justice Harlan’s test,
216
whether the second part of the test is satisfied is irrelevant.
Therefore, the Jackson dissent is correct that the decision not to
suppress the evidence in Lien was based on the “conclusion that the
217
But, because the facts
error was not of a constitutional nature.”
of Jackson show that the error was of a constitutional nature, the
218
search requires analysis under the Camara ‘reasonableness’ test.
B. Application of the Camara ‘Reasonableness’ Test
According to Camara, a search is reasonable if the
government’s need to search outweighs the intrusion which the
219
search entails. Applying the Camara balancing test to the facts of
Jackson requires the conclusion that the search of Jackson’s home
was ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.
As the Jackson majority indicates, section 626.14 articulates the
‘governmental need’ portion of the test—the government must
need to search at night to prevent the loss of evidence or protect
220
police or public safety. This need logically requires an additional
justification beyond probable cause for a nighttime search warrant
221
Other
to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
jurisdictions have similar procedural rules or statutes conditionally
222
permitting nighttime searches and consistently reach the same
223
result.
215. Id. According to the United States Naval Observatory, the end of civil
twilight on September 23, 1977 in Rochester, Minnesota (where Lien’s apartment
was located) was at 7:34 p.m. Sun and Moon Data for One Day, supra note 206.
216. Justice Harlan’s test is conjunctive, not disjunctive. See Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
217. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 181 (Minn. 2007) (Anderson, G. Barry,
J., dissenting).
218. See Moylan & Sonsteng, supra note 51, at 210 (noting that when the
Fourth Amendment is applicable, the next step is to determine whether the
amendment is satisfied).
219. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967).
220. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 177 (majority opinion).
221. Id.
222. Catalano, supra note 40, at 171.
223. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A)(ii) (“good cause” required for
nighttime provision in search warrant); Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430,
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The only evidence the warrant-issuing judge had in support of
a nighttime search under section 626.14 was the investigator’s bare
assertion that in his opinion, the evidence led him into the
224
Nowhere in the
nighttime scope of a search warrant.
investigator’s affidavit did he state that a nighttime search was
225
necessary to preserve evidence or protect police or public safety.
Arguably, the police or public safety element of section 626.14
could have been satisfied had Jackson been manufacturing
226
methamphetamine in her home, but this was not the case. Thus,
the investigator never indicated a need to search Jackson’s home at
227
night and the nighttime search provision was invalid.
The Jackson dissent claims that the investigator’s entire affidavit
228
Since prior
must be considered in determining warrant validity.
Minnesota cases have held that a nighttime search warrant may
issue when the affidavit attests to drug-related activity, the dissent
229
The entire
argued the nighttime search warrant was valid here.
affidavit, however, fails to suggest that the investigator believed the
methamphetamine would be gone by morning or was an imminent
230
Moreover, the cases relied upon
danger to the police or public.
by the dissent are distinguishable. In the first case, the affidavit
specifically stated that the defendant could destroy the evidence,
231
In the second case, the affidavit
thus satisfying section 626.14.
explicitly stated that the search be conducted at night because an
informant witnessed the defendant selling drugs from the trunk of his
car; therefore the evidence could have been lost or removed from
461 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting Congress frequently requires more
stringent justifications for nighttime searches than daytime searches); Roth v.
State, 735 N.W.2d 882, 890–91 (N.D. 2007) (N.D. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1)(E) requires
‘reasonable cause’ for issuance of a nighttime warrant over and above probable
cause required for daytime warrant); State v. Salley, 514 A.2d 465, 467 (Me. 1986)
(same under ME. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)).
224. See Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 166, 177, 179 (discussing investigator’s search
warrant affidavit).
225. See id. at 166 (quoting investigator’s affidavit).
226. See United States v. Tucker, 313 F.3d 1259, 1265 (10th Cir. 2002)
(nighttime execution of search warrant upheld because of significant risk of
destruction of evidence, personal injuries, and property damage due to volatile
nature of chemicals and processes in manufacturing methamphetamine).
227. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 177. The state also conceded that the nighttime
search provision was invalid. Id.
228. Id. at 184 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting).
229. Id. (citing State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 928–29 (Minn. 2006); State v.
Saver, 295 Minn. 581, 582, 205 N.W.2d 508, 508–09 (1973)).
230. See id. at 166 (quoting investigator’s affidavit).
231. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d at 925.
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232

the search location.
In any event, as the Fourth Amendment
applies under the facts of Jackson, the dissent’s argument becomes
even more unpersuasive once the ‘invasion which a nighttime
search entails’ weight is placed on the scale, even considering the
entire affidavit.
The government’s need to search Jackson’s home at night was
negligible at best. Balanced against the invasion which nighttime
searches entail, the only logical conclusion is that the search was
‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.
Nighttime
233
Such
intrusions are among the most severe invasions of privacy.
intrusions bear directly on the personal nature of activities that
234
They violate the sanctity of the
occur in the nighttime home.
235
These concerns are
home and endanger “slumbering citizens.”
not alleviated when the person entering the home is a police
236
In fact, being subject to law
officer executing a search warrant.
enforcement activity at night produces a more anxious and
237
threatening atmosphere than during the day.
Therefore, the
invasion entailed in the nighttime search of Jackson’s home
outweighed law enforcement’s need to search her home at night
and was ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.
C. Application of the Weeks-Mapp ‘Exclusionary Rule’
Generally, the application of the exclusionary rule is limited to
238
Thus,
those times when its remedial objectives are best served.
balancing the costs of suppression against the benefits determines
239
the rule’s applicability.
232. Saver, 295 Minn. at 582, 205 N.W.2d at 508.
233. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958) (“[I]t is difficult
to imagine a more severe intrusion of privacy than the nighttime intrusion into a
private home.”); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477 (1971) (nighttime
entries into a home are an “extremely serious intrusion.”).
234. George E. Dix, Means of Executing Searches and Seizures as Fourth Amendment
Issues, 67 MINN. L. REV. 89, 150 (1982–83); Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner
City: Application of the Curtilage Doctrine to Urban and Suburban Areas, 15 GEO. MASON
U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 297, 312 n.60 (2005).
235. Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Mass. 1992).
236. United States v. Smith, 340 F.Supp. 1023, 1029 (D. Conn. 1972).
237. Dix, supra note 234, at 150; Leonetti, supra note 234, at 312 n.60.
238. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
239. See id. at 349–50 (weighing the potential injury to the role and functions
of a grand jury against the potential benefits of exclusion); Pennsylvania Bd. of
Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (exclusionary rule only applies
when its deterrence benefits outweigh its “‘substantial social costs’” (quoting Leon
v. United States, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984))).
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The costs of excluding the evidence seized in the nighttime
search of Jackson’s home are potentially great. Jackson’s home
contained methamphetamine, a highly addictive and dangerous
240
Moreover, Jackson’s two teen-aged children were
narcotic.
241
Jackson risked
present when the police executed the warrant.
her children becoming two of the 731,000 individuals aged twelve
242
Yet Jackson was never
or older who abuse methamphetamine.
punished for possession of narcotics or child endangerment, even
though a jury found her guilty of the crimes, partially because the
Minnesota Supreme Court determined that suppression was
243
necessary to protect her Fourth Amendment rights.
Although the costs of excluding the seized evidence are
significant, the benefits of exclusion are greater. History shows a
244
unique aversion towards unjustified nighttime searches, and Boyd,
the first important Fourth Amendment case, strongly encourages
245
Moreover, and as the
that this history be taken into account.
Jackson majority indicates, suppression is the only way to deter
246
Section 626.14 codifies what
future violations of section 626.14.
247
the Minnesota legislature deems a reasonable nighttime search.
If law enforcement is allowed to search a home at night because an
affiant-officer claims section 626.14 is satisfied, then the statute
248
should be stricken from the Minnesota Code.
Finally, both aforementioned points relate directly to the fact
that if the evidence were allowed, the Minnesota Supreme Court
would disregard both its own constitution and the United States
Constitution. Justice Marshall’s Gooding dissent notes:
[T]he idea of the police unnecessarily forcing their
way into [a home] in the middle of the night—
frequently, in narcotics cases,... —rousing the
240. National Institute on Drug Abuse Website, NIDA InfoFacts:
Methamphetamine at http://www.nida.nih.gov/InfoFacts/methamphetamine.
html (last visited Nov. 2, 2008) [hereinafter NIDA InfoFacts: Methamphetamine].
241. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Minn. 2007).
242. NIDA InfoFacts: Methamphetamine, supra note 238.
243. See Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 167.
244. See supra Part II.A.
245. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–25 (1886) (discussed supra
note 210).
246. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 179.
247. Id. at 174.
248. See generally Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (noting without an
exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amendment “might as well be stricken from the
Constitution.”).
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residents out of their beds, and forcing them to stand
by in indignity in their night clothes while the police
rummage through their belongings does indeed
smack of a “‘police state’ lacking in the respect for
249
. . . the U.S. Constitution.”
This, according to Justice Clark in Mapp v. Ohio, would erode the
250
Thus, suppression was
very foundations of our government.
required, unless the Leon ‘good faith’ exception applies.
D. Inapplicability of the Leon ‘Good Faith’ Exception
The Leon ‘good faith’ exception allows the inclusion of
evidence obtained with a search warrant later found to be invalid,
so long as the officers who applied for and executed the warrant
had an objectively reasonable good faith belief that the warrant was
251
The Jackson majority rejected the dissent’s argument that
valid.
Leon should apply as the court had specifically declined to adopt
252
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, has
the exception.
253
never explicitly rejected the Leon good faith exception.
Nonetheless, even if Minnesota followed Leon, an exception to the
exception proves the rule inapplicable under the facts of Jackson.
Generally, police act in good faith when executing a warrant
254
Yet Leon itself notes that a magistrate
issued by a magistrate.
cannot issue a warrant based on the “‘bare conclusions of
255
Thus, the good faith exception is inapplicable when a
others.’”
warrant is issued “based on an affidavit that does not ‘provide the
magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of
256
probable cause.’”
The investigator’s affidavit in Jackson was supported by

249. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-538, at 12 (1969)).
250. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
251. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 898–99 (1984).
252. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 180 n.10 (Minn. 2007).
253. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 791 n.1 (Minn. 1999) (declining
to address state’s request to adopt ‘good faith’ exception); State v. Zanter, 535
N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn. 1995) (declining to address applicability of a good faith
exception); State v. Lindsey, 473 N.W.2d 857, 864 n.4 (Minn. 1991) (same); State
v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 701 n.1 (Minn. 1990) (refusing to address issue
whether Minnesota should follow Leon).
254. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
255. Id. at 915 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983)).
256. Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 239).
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257

probable cause for the issuance of a daytime warrant.
Section
626.14, however, requires a showing of reasonable suspicion over
258
and above probable cause for issuance of a nighttime warrant.
Thus, an affiant-officer must show that the evidence may be lost or
the police or public endangered if the search is not conducted at
259
The investigator’s statement in his affidavit “that ‘[t]his
night.
investigation has led your affiant into the nighttime [sic] scope of
260
search warrant’” was a “bare conclusion” that the warrant-issuing
261
judge could not rely upon to include the nighttime provision.
Therefore, the police in Jackson, especially the investigator who
obtained the warrant, failed to act in good faith and Leon is
inapplicable.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the Fourth Amendment
can provide a separate and independent basis of evidence
suppression apart from section 626.14. Therefore, the Jackson
majority reached the correct conclusion, though missing the first,
and most critical, step in the analysis—whether the Fourth
Amendment is even applicable, determined by Justice Harlan’s
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Jackson dissent is a more appealing outcome, the
conclusion the majority reaches is the correct one, albeit through a
flawed analytical framework. Yet, one must keep in mind what is at
stake. Americans place great value on in-home privacy, especially
262
during the night. Minnesota in particular has codified this value

257. See State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Minn. 2007) (quoting
investigator’s affidavit which clearly established probable cause).
258. State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006). “Reasonable
suspicion” is defined as “something more than an unarticulated hunch, that the
officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion
at issue.” State v. Wasson, 615 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. 2000).
259. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d at 927 (interpreting section 626.14 to require
reasonable suspicion that a nighttime search is necessary to prevent loss of
evidence or protect police or public safety).
260. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 166.
261. See, e.g., Marcus v. Search Warrant of Prop. at 104 E. Tenth St., Kansas
City, Mo., 367 U.S. 717, 731–32 (1961) (affidavit stating existence of cause to
search, with nothing more, insufficient for magistrate to issue valid warrant);
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1933) (same); Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927) (same).
262. See supra Part II.A.
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263

in section 626.14.
Violating this statute does not mean that
suppression is required any time police conduct a nighttime search.
It simply means that the police must follow the law while enforcing
264
If Minnesota wants to punish people like Susan Jackson, the
it.
legislature must enact a statute allowing nighttime searches for
265
drug-related offenses, similar to other states.
Without such a
statute, law enforcement must follow the dictates of section 626.14
or wait until daytime to search a private residence. Otherwise,
police risk implicating the Fourth Amendment, possibly to the
exclusion of the seized evidence.
A guilty person did go free, and although difficult to swallow,
she went free on the basis of a two-hundred-year-old law—the
266
By
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
providing Susan Jackson with this separate and independent basis
of suppression, the Minnesota Supreme Court made sure not to
267
“disregard the charter of its own existence.”

263. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 174.
264. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1959).
265. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-5-8 (1975) (explicitly allowing a nighttime search
for controlled substance law violations); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1230 (2005)
(explicitly allowing nighttime searches for suspected controlled substance
manufacturing).
266. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 184–85.
267. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (Clark, J.).
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